LAFD Could Have Had at Least 10 Engines Patrolling Palisades Hills, Former Chiefs Say
The Los Angeles Fire Department’s (LAFD) response to the January 7 Palisades fire was criticized by former top officials, who claimed that the department could have had at least 10 engines patrolling the hills and canyons, potentially preventing the destruction of nearly 7,000 homes and the loss of at least 12 lives.
The first 911 call came at 10:29 a.m., from a resident of Piedra Morada Drive in Pacific Palisades, reporting a fire visible in the distance, with flames flickering over a chaparral-choked ridge. It would be more than 18 minutes before Engine 23 or any other firefighting crew reached the scene, according to an LAFD incident log obtained by The Times.
Travel times were especially critical given that LAFD officials had decided not to pre-deploy any engines and firefighters to the Palisades, despite being warned that some of the most dangerous winds in recent years were headed for the region. The National Weather Service had highlighted the Palisades, the San Fernando Valley, and Hollywood as among the areas of "greatest concern" for the expected windstorm and the extraordinary fire hazard it would bring.
A total of 18 firefighters are typically on duty at Stations 23 and 69 to respond to emergencies, but only 14 are routinely available to fight brush fires, as the other four are assigned to ambulances at the stations. The Palisades fire’s toll might not have been as bad if extra engines had been pre-positioned much closer to the most fire-prone areas, according to former LAFD chiefs.
The LAFD could have also sent more engines to patrol the hills and canyons, which would have enabled crews to monitor the area where the fire eventually started, potentially spotting the blaze early and giving them a chance to control it. Instead, the crews nearest to the fire were based at Stations 23 and 69, about three to four miles from the Piedra Morada address on a street map.
The LAFD’s failure to provide more engines put firefighters "at a strategic disadvantage from the first play," said Rick Crawford, a former LAFD battalion chief who left the department last year. "The firefighters did an outstanding job given the hand they were dealt. … They just didn’t have time to employ their normal tactics."
Former LAFD Asst. Chief Patrick Butler, now chief of the Redondo Beach Fire Department, said that chaparral can burn underground without visible flames for weeks after the original fire has been knocked down. He had to deal with flare-ups of unseen embers for about a week after the 2019 Getty fire, for which he served as an LAFD commander.
Rekindles are "a very common phenomenon," Butler said. "A rekindle can easily grow in the right conditions, like high winds." He noted that fires are always more challenging to fight in strong winds, but pre-deploying engines could enable crews to flank a blaze to "keep it skinny" while other rigs attack the head of the flames from a safe distance with help, if available, from helicopters.
Former LAFD Asst. Chief Perry Vermillion, who fought numerous blazes in the Malibu area near the Palisades, agreed. "If you don’t hit it hard in the beginning, it’s over," he said. "The LAFD should have staged engines at several points in the Palisades and kept them moving and on the lookout before the windstorm hit."
The LAFD should have also sent more engines to patrol the hills and canyons, Vermillion said, and kept them moving and on the lookout before the windstorm hit. "You drive around, you drive up the hills and learn the area. You’re on patrol. You send a couple of strike teams up here or there and hang out in a park. You move them to all different places so they’re close to the brush."
In defending her department’s decision not to order a large pre-deployment, LAFD Chief Kristin Crowley blamed budget cuts and a backlog of engines in ill repair. However, The Times has reported that the department had more than enough working engines to send dozens of extra rigs to the Palisades and elsewhere.
The investigation into the Palisades fire is ongoing, and the LAFD has yet to release records documenting their actions in the early stages of the fire. The department’s failure to provide more engines put firefighters "at a strategic disadvantage from the first play," said Crawford. "The firefighters did an outstanding job given the hand they were dealt. … They just didn’t have time to employ their normal tactics."
Conclusion:
The LAFD’s response to the January 7 Palisades fire was criticized by former top officials, who claimed that the department could have had at least 10 engines patrolling the hills and canyons, potentially preventing the destruction of nearly 7,000 homes and the loss of at least 12 lives. The department’s failure to pre-deploy engines and firefighters to the Palisades, despite being warned of the severe windstorm and fire hazard, has raised questions about the department’s preparedness and decision-making in the face of disaster.
FAQs:
- Why did the LAFD not pre-deploy engines and firefighters to the Palisades before the fire?
- The LAFD was warned of the severe windstorm and fire hazard, but decided not to pre-deploy engines and firefighters to the Palisades.
- How many engines were available to respond to the fire?
- A total of 18 firefighters were on duty at Stations 23 and 69, but only 14 were available to fight brush fires.
- What is the role of rekindles in wildfire fighting?
- Rekindles are a common phenomenon in which chaparral can burn underground without visible flames for weeks after the original fire has been knocked down.
- How can wildfires be prevented?
- Wildfires can be prevented by taking steps to reduce the risk of ignitions, such as clearing flammable vegetation and using fire-resistant materials in construction.
